道德运气与道德责任问题
【内容提要】根据直到康德才得以完全确立的传统道德责任观念，一个人必须要为之负责任的事情只是那
种直接依从他的意志作用力而完成的行为，而独立于意志的任何东西一直被认为是与道德特性的归属毫无
关系的，这在不同的意义上既符合、也悖于道德直观。然而，如果道德运气是一个实在的道德概念，那么
，传统的道德责任观念就必须加以修正，因为我们也应该为那种超越于人的控制能力（此根植于意志）的
事情负责。尽管如此，与首次严肃地将道德运气概念引入当代道德理论论域的伯纳德·威廉姆斯不同，本
文认为，对于所谓“超越”必须有某些限制，而且这些限制可归结为本文所说的“道德关联”也即与康德
式的意愿性行为的关联，这种意愿性行为在本文中具体表现为行为者的过错。这样，道德运气概念就有理
由继续维系于康德式的道德责任观念，至少应该与后者保持某种连续性。
【关键词】道德运气 道德责任 意愿性行为 行为者遗憾 正当性证明
Abstract: According to the traditional conception of moral responsibility, which up to Kant
had been established completely, what a person must be responsible for is nothing more than
what is done directly from her or his agency, whereas anything that is independent of the
will has been regarded as irrelevant to the ascription of moral status. This seems to be
both compatible and incompatible with moral intuition in different senses. If moral luck is
a real concept of morality, the conception has to be revised to the extent that we should be
held responsible for what is beyond the controlling capability grounded in the will.
Nevertheless, unlike Bernard Williams who first seriously introduced the concept of moral
luck into the contemporary realm of moral theory, the present paper maintains that there
must be some li
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